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This Article reviews some of the most significant developments in the
work of international courts and tribunals in 2016.

I. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
In 2016, which marked the ICJ's 70th anniversary, the Court issued five
judgments on preliminary objections relating to two important
controversies: the maritime boundary and sovereign rights dispute between
Nicaragua and Colombia (NICOL II and NICOL 1112), and the Marshall
Islands' complaints against India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom
concerning their obligations to negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms
race and nuclear disarmament (MarshallIslands3).
&

* The Committee Editor is Paula F. Henin, Associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
Flom LLP ("Skadden"). Paula F. Henin and Zoe Cooper Sutton, Trainee Solicitor at Skadden,
authored Section II. Sara L. Ochs, Associate at Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn LLP,
contributed Section III. Joseph Klingler, Nick Renzler and Melissa Stewart, Associates at Foley
Hoag LLP, wrote Section IV. Kabir Duggal and Robyn Lym, Associates at Baker & McKenzie
LLP, authored Section V. Sean Stephenson, Associate at Appleton & Associates, contributed
Section VI. The views expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily
represent the views of their law firms or their firms' clients.
1. Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia
beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment,
Preliminary Objections (Mar. 17, 2016), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/
18956.pdf [hereinafter NICOL Il].
2. Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar.
v. Colom.), Judgment, Preliminary Objections (Mar. 17, 2016), available at http://www.icj-cij
.org/docket/files/155/18948.pdf [hereinafter NICOL IIl].
3. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race
and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Judgment, Jurisdiction of the Court and
Admissibility of the Application (Oct. 5, 2016), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
158/19134.pdf [hereinafter Marshall Islands v. India]; Obligations Concerning Negotiations
Relating to the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v.
Pak.), Judgment of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (Oct 5, 2016), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/159/19166.pdf [hereinafter Marshall Islands v. Pakistan];
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Judgment, Preliminary Objections (Oct. 5, 2016),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/19198.pdf [hereinafter Marshall Islands v.
UK].
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In these judgments, the ICJ shed additional light on the notion of a legal
"dispute" in international law, addressing the following questions: when does
a "dispute" arise; when is a dispute considered finally and definitively settled
by a judgment; and where does the line lie between the enforcement of a
judgment settling an "old" dispute and the bringing of a "new" dispute to
judicial settlement?
A.

EXISTENCE OF A "DISPUTE"

In each of its 2016 judgments, the Court reaffirmed that its jurisdiction is
conditional upon the existence, on the date of filing of the application, of an
"actual dispute between the Parties."4
The established case law of the Court defines a dispute as "a disagreement
on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests" and
emphasizes that the existence of a dispute "is a matter for objective
determination" turning on "an examination of the facts. The matter is one
of substance, not of form."5 "It must be shown that the claim of one party is
positively opposed by the other."6 The ICJ reaffirmed these broad
principles in each of its 2016 judgments.
However, in Marshall Islands, the Court (by a narrow majority) introduced
a new "awareness" test for the existence of a "dispute," drawing upon its
holding in NICOL III that "Colombia was aware that its [conduct was]
positively opposed by Nicaragua,"? and thus that a dispute did exist
concerning Nicaragua's first claim.8 In Marshall Islands, the Court fully
articulated the new test as follows: "a dispute exists when it is demonstrated,
on the basis of the evidence, that the respondent was aware, or could not
have been unaware, that its views were 'positively opposed' by the
applicant."9
The Court's departure from its previous case law and the subjective
character of its new "awareness" criterion were severely criticized in several
dissenting and separate opinions in Marshall Islands, which also opposed the
Court's strict and formalistic application of the general requirement that a
dispute exist on the date of the application, arguing that post-application
events crystallizing the dispute should have been taken into account.
4. NICOL II, spra note 1, T 124.
5. See NICOL HI, supra note 2, T 50.
6. Id.
7. Id. T 73.
8. NICOL 11, supra note 2, 1 58 (Caron, J., dissenting) (criticizing the holding and arguing
that there was no basis in the case law of the ICJ to infer the assertion of a claim where that
claim was never communicated to the respondent), available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 55/
18964.pdf.
9. Marshall Islands v. UK, supra note 3, T 41; Marshall Islands v. India, supra note 3, T 38;
Marshall Islands v. Pakistan, supra note 3, T 38.
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129

RES JUDICATA

In NICOL II, Nicaragua's First Request was that the Court adjudge and
declare "[t]he precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua
and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to each of
them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court"o in its 2012
judgment in NICOL I (the "2012 Judgment')."
Colombia objected to the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that the
principle of res judicata barred it from examining Nicaragua's request.12
Colombia argued that the Court had already disposed of Nicaragua's First
Request in subparagraph 3 of the operative clause of its 2012 Judgment,'3 in
which the Court expressly found that it "could not uphold" Nicaragua's
request that the Court adjudge and declare that "[t]he appropriate form of
delimitation, within the geographical and legal framework constituted by the
mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colombia, is a continental shelf boundary.
dividing by equal parts the overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf of
both Parties."l4 According to Colombia, the Court, in its 2012 Judgment,.
found Nicaragua's request admissible but rejected it on the merits due to
lack of evidence.15 Thus, Colombia reasoned, the 2012 Judgment contained
a decision on the merits of that request, which carried res judicata effect.
For its part, Nicaragua argued that the Court in NICOL I refused to rule
on the merits of the relevant request because Nicaragua had failed to fulfill a
procedural and institutional requirement: the completion of its submission
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) as
required by Article 76(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS),6 a Convention to which Nicaragua-unlike
Colombia-was a party. 7 According to Nicaragua, the Court in its 2012
Judgment only decided whether it was then "in a position to determine 'a
continental shelf boundary . . ."18

and concluded that it was not, because

Nicaragua had only provided the CLCS with "Preliminary Information."l9
Re-characterizing Colombia's preliminary objection as one of
admissibility rather than jurisdiction,20 the Court "examined subparagraph 3
of the operative clause of the 2012 Judgment in its context, namely by
reference to the reasoning which underpins its adoption and accordingly
10. NICOL II, supra note 1, 1 10.
11. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 624 (Nov. 19)
[hereinafter NICOL I or the "2012 Judgment"].
12. NICOL II, supra note 1, 1 47.
13. Id. 1 49.
14. Id. (citing NICOL I, supra note 11, 1 17).
15. NICOL II, supra note 1, ¶1 51, 56, 63-67.
16. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea annex VII art. 9, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833

U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
17. NICOL II, supra note
18. NICOL II, supra note
19. NICOL II, supra note
20. NICOL II, supra note

UNCLOS].
1, 91 68-71.
1, ¶ 69 (citing NICOL I, supra note 11, ¶ 129).
1, ¶¶ 69-70 (citing NICOL I, supra note 11, ¶1 113, 227-29).
1, 1 48.
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serves to clarify its meaning."21 The Court, ascribing particular weight to
Paragraph 129 of its 2012 Judgment, ultimately agreed with Nicaragua's
interpretation and concluded that "[t]he Court . . . did not settle the

question of delimitation in 2012 because it was not, at that time, in a
position to do so."22 Thus, the Court held, res judicata did not attach to the
2012 Judgment with respect to that issue.23
The Court adopted this decision by the thinnest possible margin, in an
eight to eight vote decided by the President's casting vote. The Court's
majority opinion was accompanied by a joint dissenting opinion signed by
seven judges, and three additional separate and dissenting opinions on the
issue-all arguing that the 2012 Judgment was a decision on the merits
having res judicata effect, either in respect of all, or only some, of the
overlapping entitlements between Nicaragua and Colombia.24

C.

ENFORCEMENT OF A JUDGMENT VS.
CONCERNING RELATED RIGHTS

NEW

DISPUTE

In NICOL III, the Court addressed Colombia's preliminary objection to a
separate application brought by Nicaragua, which Colombia argued was an
attempt to enforce the Court's 2012 Judgment rather than a "new" claim, as
Nicaragua maintained. According to Colombia, the Court lacked postadjudicative enforcement jurisdiction, which is reserved for the Security
Council in accordance with Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, and therefore
could not entertain Nicaragua's application.
By fifteen votes to one, the Court rejected Colombia's preliminary
objection.25 The Court held that, even though the 2012 Judgment was
"undoubtedly relevant to [the] dispute,"26 "Nicaragua [did] not seek to

enforce the 2012 Judgment as such," but rather
ask[ed] the Court to adjudge and declare that Colombia ha[d] breached
'its obligation not to violate Nicaragua's maritime zones as delimited in
[NICOL I] as well as Nicaragua's sovereign rights and jurisdiction in
these zones' and 'that, consequently, Colombia has the obligation to
wipe out the legal and material consequences of its internationally
wrongful acts, and make full reparation for the harm caused by those
acts.'27
21. Id. ¶ 75.
22. Id. T 85.
23. Id. 1 88.
24. See NICOL II, supra note 1 (joint dissenting opinion) (Owada, J., separate opinion)
(Greenwood, J., separate opinion) (Donoghue, J., dissenting opinion), available at http://www
.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p 1=3 &p2=1 &k=02&case= 1 54&code=nicolb&p3=4.
25. NICOL III, supra note 2, ¶¶ 110, 111(1).
26. Id. ¶ 109.
27. Id.
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Judge Bandhari voted against this holding, and in a separate Declaration
explained his disagreement with the majority's factual conclusion that
Nicaragua did not seek to enforce the 2012 Judgment.28
For his part, Judge Canqado Trindade wrote a Separate Opinion
criticizing the Court's unwillingness to engage with Nicaragua's alternative
argument that the Court has "inherent power to pronounce on the actions
required by its Judgment[ ],"29 which in his view the Court possesses, and
argued that nothing in the text of Article 94(2) of the UN Charter confers
on the Security Council exclusive authority to secure compliance with ICJ
judgments.30
II.

Developments in International Criminal Law

2016 has marked yet another transformational year for international
criminal courts and tribunals. In the past twelve months, several of the
individuals responsible for the world's most horrific contemporary human
rights violations and war crimes have been brought to justice. Judgments
have been issued and specific developments have been made by the
International Criminal Court (ICC), the Mechanism for International
Criminal Tribunals (MICT) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC), the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
A.

THE ICC

This year, the ICC took a notable step by imposing its first conviction for
crimes of sexual violence since the Court's inception in 2002. The Court
convicted Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the military commander of the
Movement of Liberation of Congo (MLC), a highly violent rebel faction in
the Central African Republic, for the atrocities committed by MLC troops
under his leadership between 2002 and 2003.3' On June 21, 2016, Bemba
was convicted on two counts of crimes against humanity for rape and
murder, and three counts of war crimes for murder, rape, and pillaging, for
which he was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment.32 Bemba's appeal
of this judgment remains pending at the time of publication.
2

28. Id. 1 109 (Bandhari, J., declaration), available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/155/1896
.pdf.
29. NICOL III, supra note 2, 1 102.
30. NICOL III, supra note 2, IT 67-82 (Cangado Trindade, J., separate opinion), available at
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/155/18960.pdf.
31. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/

CR201602238.pdf.
32. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on
Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ¶¶ 95-96 (un. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-

cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04476.pdf.
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Several months after his conviction, Bemba, along with his case manager,
lawyer, and two witnesses in his trial, were convicted of corruptly
influencing witnesses and falsifying evidence.33 The Court has yet to impose
a sentence for these convictions.

B.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

Since July 2012, the ICTY has been operating under the jurisdiction and
administration of the MICT. The MICT was established by the United
Nations Security Council to carry out the essential functions of the ICTY
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which closed in 2015
following the completion of all trials and appeals.34
On March 24, 2016, the ICTY convicted Radovan Karad_ix of various
crimes against humanity and violations of customs of war associated with the
Bosnian War, including genocide, murder, terror, unlawful attacks on
civilians, and hostage-taking, for which he was sentenced to forty years
imprisonment.35 Karad_i, a founding member and president of the Serbian
Democratic Party and the President and Supreme Commander of the armed
forces of Republika Sprska, directed the extermination and forced removal of
Bosnian Muslims and Croat inhabitants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
served a vital role in the massacre at Srebrenica.36 His conviction represents
the successful prosecution of the most senior Bosnian Serb leader.
In addition, on June 30, 2016, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY affirmed
the convictions and sentences of twenty-two years imprisonment for both
Mixo Stanigix and Stojan _upljanin.37 Stanigi served as the Minister of the
Ministry of Interior of the Republika Sprska, and _upljanin held the title of
Chief of the Regional Security Services Centre.38 Both men participated in
the forced removal and extermination of Bosnian Muslims and Croats from
Serbia, and were ultimately convicted by the Trial Chamber on March 27,
2013, of forcible transfer, deportation and persecution as crimes against
33. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, et al., Case No. ICC 01/05-01/13, Public
Redacted Version of Judgment pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute (Oct. 19, 2016), https://

www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_18527.pdf.
34. See About the MICT, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

TuIBUNALS, http://www.unmict.org/en/about (last visited June 7, 2012).
35. Prosecutor v. Karad ic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Public Redacted Version of Judgment
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://wwwicty.org/x/cases/

Karad-ic/tjug/enl60324_judgment.pdf.
36. Prosecutor v. Karadic, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Case Information Sheet (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia), www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis-karadzicen.pdf (last

visited Apr. 5, 2017).
37. Prosecutor v. Stanilic & upljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-A, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jun. 30, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin stanisicm/acjug/

en/160630.pdf.
38. Prosecutor v. Stanigic & _upljanin, Case No. IT-08-91, Case Information Sheet (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia), www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin-stanisicn/cis/en/

cisstanisic zupljanin-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).
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humanity, and murder and torture as violations of the laws and customs of
war.

39

The ICTY also proceeded with the trial of Ratko Mladie, the prior
colonel general and commander of the army of Republika Srpska, who faces
a number of charges, including two counts of genocide.40 Closing
arguments were held in December 2016.41

C.

THE EAC

The EAC was established in 2012 with the mission of prosecuting former
Chadian Prime Minister Hissdne Habr6 and members of his government for
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during his rule between
1982 and 1990. Four years after its establishment, the EAC reached a
conviction, ultimately sentencing Habr6 to life imprisonment for a number
of crimes, including torture, murder, abduction, and unlawful detention.42
The EAC's conviction and sentencing of Habr6 represents an extremely
significant milestone for the Chambers. Habrd's counsel appealed the
judgment on June 13, 2016, marking the first appeal to be made in the EAC
and necessitating the creation of the Extraordinary African Chamber of
Assizes of Appeal.43

D.

THE ECCC

In 2016, the ECCC proceeded with the prosecution of Nuon Chea, the
prior Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (the official
name of the Khmer Rouge regime) and Khieu Samphan, the prior Chairman
of the People's Representative Assembly and the Acting Prime Minister of
Democratic Kampuchea.- The litigation against Chea and Samphan had
previously been severed into two separate trials, the first of which was
focused solely on charges related to the forced movement of persons from
39. Prosecutor v. Staniiic & _upljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgment, vol. 2 (Int'l Crim.
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
Mar. 27, 2013),
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia

zupljanin stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-2.pdf.
40. Prosecutor v. Mladic, IT-09-92, Case Information Sheet (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis-mladic-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 12,

2017).
41. Id.
42. Prosecutor v. Hissen Habr6, Delivery and Summary of Judgment (Assize Ct. of the
Extraordinary African Chambers May 30, 2016), http://www.chambresafricaines.org/pdf/

Prononc%C3%A9-r%C3%A9sum%C3%A9%20du%20
Jugement%20HH%2020160528%20[620786].pdf.
43. Press Release, Extraordinary African Chambers, Defense Lawyers Appeal (June 13, 2016),
3
available at http://www.chambresafricaines.org/index.php/le-coin-des-medias/communiquC
%A9-de-presse/640-les-avocats-de-la-dC3`%A9fense-interjettent-appel.html.
44. Prosecutor v. Chea & Samphan, Case No. 002/01, Summary of Judgment in Case 002/01
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.eccc.gov.kh/

sites/default/files/articles/20140807%20FINAL%20Summary%200f/o20Judgement%
.pdf.
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Phnom Penh and other regions of the country, as well as the execution of
Khmer Republic soldiers at the Tuol Po Chrey execution site in 1975.45 In
the first trial, both Chea and Samphan were convicted of these charges and
were sentenced to life imprisonment.46 Following the defendants' appeal, on
November 23, 2016, the Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC issued a
judgment quashing the defendant's convictions pertaining to crimes against
humanity of extermination and persecution on political grounds.47
However, in the same judgment, the Chamber upheld the defendants'
convictions for crimes against humanity of murder and other inhumane acts,
thereby affirming the sentences of life imprisonment.48
This year, the ECCC also proceeded with the prosecution of Chea and
Samphan in the second of the two severed trials. This trial focuses on the
remaining charges against the two defendants, including crimes against
humanity relating to their involvement in the genocide of Chain and
Vietnamese peoples, forced marriages, rape, and the operation of the S-21
Security Centre, in which thousands of persons were tortured and executed
at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.49 For the past several months, dozens of
witnesses have testified against Chea and Samphan regarding these charges,
but a date for the issuance of a judgment has yet to be scheduled.
Investigation also remains ongoing with regard to Case 003 against Meas
Muth, Case 004 against Ao An and Yim Tith, and Case 004-01 against Im
Chaem.
E.

THE

STL

The STL, which was created to prosecute the persons involved in carrying
out the February 14, 2005, Beirut bombings, which killed 22 people,
including then Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, issued several
contempt judgments in 2016 related to the publication of information on
confidential witnesses. The STL imposed contempt fines of 20,000 and
6,000 on Ibrahim Al Amin and the media company Akhbar Beirut S.A.L.,
45. Prosecutor v. Chea & Samphan, Case No. 002/02, Decision on Additional Severance of
Case 002 and Scope of Case 002/02, 11 41-44 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of
Cambodia Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.eccc.gov/kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/
2014-04-07%2016:12/E301_9 1_EN-optimized.pdf.
46. Prosecutor v. Chea & Samphan, Case No. 002/01, Case 002/01 Judgment (Extraordinary
Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/
articles/20140807%20FINAL%2OSummary%20of%2OJudgement%20ENG.pdf.
47. Prosecutor v. Chea & Samphan, Case No. 002/01, Appeal Judgment (Extraordinary
Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.eccc.gov/kh/sites/default/files/
documents/courtdoc/2016-11-23%2011:55/Case%20002_01 %2OAppeal%20Judgment.pdf.
48. Id.
49. Prosecutor v. Chea & Samphan, Case No. 002/02, Case Information Sheet (Extraordinary
Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia), https://www.eccc.gov/kh/en/case/topic/1299 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2017).
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respectively,50 but affirmed the acquittal of media company Al Jadeed and
reversed the conviction of Al Jadeed TV's Deputy Head of News and
Political Programs, Ms. Karma Al Khayat, for similar charges.51

III.

The South China Sea Arbitration Award

On July 12, 2016, a Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS
(or the "Convention") issued its long-awaited Award in the South China Sea
Arbitration between the Philippines and China.52 This article describes five
of the decision's most notable contributions to international law.

A.

CHINA'S

NON-PARTICIPATION

China declined to participate in the arbitration and publicly rejected its
legitimacy and legality.53 The Tribunal's procedural actions sought to
safeguard China's rights and bolster the legitimacy of its decisions
In conformity with the
notwithstanding China's non-appearance.
Convention and the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure,54 the Tribunal
recognized that China's non-participation was not a bar to the proceedings
or to China's status as a "Party to the arbitration," and determined that
China "shall be bound by any award the Tribunal issues."55 Additionally, the
Tribunal recognized that China's non-participation engendered a "special
responsibility . . . to satisfy itself 'not only that it ha[d] jurisdiction over the
dispute but also that the claim [was] well founded in fact and law,"56 and
57
took a number of steps to do so.
First, the Tribunal decided that certain statements made by China outside
of the arbitration, including a legal memorandum submitted by China
individually to each of the five arbitrators but not formally to them as a
Tribunal, constituted pleas on jurisdiction.58 The Tribunal bifurcated the
50. Prosecutor v. Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. & Al Amin, Case No. STL-14-06, Public Redacted
Version of the Judgment (Special Trib. for Leb. July 5, 2016), https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/thecases/contempt-cases/stl-14-06/judgments-stl-1

4

6 5

-0 / 0

92

-fO

262

prv.

51. Prosecutor v. Al Jadeed S.A.L. & Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05, Public Redacted
Version of Judgment on Appeal (Special Trib. for Leb. Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.stl-tslI/
org.en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05/filings-stil-14-05/appeal-1/judgments-stl-14-05/

482340028.
52. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-2019, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb.
75 2
/ 01 6 / . ./PH-CN-20160712July 12, 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/1
Award.pdf [hereinafter Award].

53. Id. 1 11.
54. See e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 16.
55. Award, supra note 52,

¶

12.

56. Id.
57. See South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-2019, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, TJ 39, 58 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.pcacases
.coni/web/sendAttach/1506 [hereinafter Award on 7urisdiction].

58. Id.

¶1

55-56, 132.
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proceedingss9 and put numerous questions to the Philippines regarding
potential additional jurisdictional objections not raised by China.60 Second,
the Tribunal sought neutral sources of information to assist it in
"establishing whether the Philippines' claims [were] well founded in fact and
law,"61 including by appointing various independent experts. 62 Third, the
Tribunal "invit[ed] comments from both Parties on materials that were not
originally part of the record submitted to the Tribunal by the Philippines"63
- these materials included both information that the Tribunal had sought
out itself and that had been published by the Taiwan Authority of China and
related entities 64 . Finally, the Tribunal provided China with ample
opportunity to comment on various aspects of the proceedings, "consistently
remind[ing] China that it remained open to it to participate in [the]
proceedings at any stage."65

B.

ENTITLEMENT AND DELIITATION

China objected to the Tribunal's jurisdiction on the basis of its UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(a)(i) declaration, which excludes disputes regarding maritime
boundary delimitation from compulsory dispute resolution. According to
China, the issues presented by the Philippines, in particular "maritime
claims, the legal nature of maritime features, [and] the extent of relevant
maritime rights," were "part and parcel of maritime delimitation," and were
therefore covered by the declaration.66 The Tribunal disagreed, deciding
that a "dispute concerning the existence of an entitlement to maritime zones
is distinct from a dispute concerning the delimitation of those zones in an
area where the entitlements of parties overlap."67 Entitlement is a separate
determination that precedes delimitation, and thus, the Tribunal could
determine those entitlements without engaging in delimitation.68

C.

HISTORIC AND OTHER RIGHTS

The Philippines sought to challenge China's claims to sovereign and
historic rights within the maritime area of the South China Sea encompassed
by the "nine-dash line." The Tribunal found that China's "claim of historic
rights to living and non-living resources is not compatible with the
Convention . . . ."69
59. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-2019, Procedural Order No.
4, '1 1.1-1.4 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1807.
60. Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 57, ¶¶ 92, 120, 197.
61. Award, supra note 52, T 15.
62. Id. T¶ 58, 136, 138.
63. Id. IT 15, 89.
64. Id. ¶ 89
65. Id. 1 27.
66. Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 57, T 138.
67. Id. T 156.
68. Id. T 156-157.
69. Award, supra note 52, T 272.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal determined that UNCLOS
Article 62 was clear in affording "sovereign rights to the living and nonliving resources of the exclusive economic zone to the coastal State alone,"
and not to any other State.70 The same principle applied to the continental
shelf under Article 77.71 Importantly, the Tribunal observed that "the
Convention is comprehensive in setting out the nature of the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf and the rights of other States within
those zones."72 In the absence of any provisions in the Convention
preserving historic (or other) rights within those zones, China's claims to
such rights within the nine-dash line beyond 200 meters from China's coast
were incompatible with, and had been superseded by, the Convention, and
were "without lawful effect."73 In any event, the Tribunal rejected China's
claim to historic rights under pre-Convention law, finding that "[h]istorical
navigation and fishing, beyond the territorial sea, cannot ... form the basis
for the emergence of a historic right."74
The Tribunal also distinguished between historic rights to maritime space,
which attach to the State, and traditional fishing rights, which attach to
individuals. Traditional fishing rights within the territorial sea remain
protected under international law, and were unaltered by the Convention;7s
thus, the Tribunal recognized and protected those rights within the
territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal.76 By contrast, traditional fishing rights
in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) were expressly extinguished by the
Convention, "except insofar as Article 62(3) specifies that 'the need to
minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually
fished in the zone' shall constitute one of the factors to be taken into account
by the coastal State in giving access to any surplus in the allowable catch."77
D.

THE

REGIME OF ISLANDS

UNCLOS Article 121(3) provides that "[r]ocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf."78 Only once before had Article 121
been applied to determine whether a particular feature was a "rock," and in
that case, the issue was not whether the feature in question was a "rock" or a
fully-entitled "island" (as in the South China Sea Arbitration), but rather
whether it was a "rock" or a "low-tide elevation."79
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
397.
79.

Id. ¶ 243 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 244.
Id. 1 246.
Id. ] 246-247, 278.
Id. IT 263-71.
Id. ¶ 804(c).
Id. ¶1 806-07, 811-12.
Id. I 804(b) (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 62(3)).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 121(3), Dec. 10. 1982, U.N.T.S.
See NICOL I, supra note 11,
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In determining whether various features in the South China Sea fell under
Article 121(3), the Tribunal established a number of guidelines, including:
(1) "size cannot be dispositive .

.

. and is not, on its own, a relevant factor";8o

(2) "human habitation entails more than the mere survival of humans on a
feature and that economic life entails more than the presence of resources";81
(3) "a purely official or military population, serviced from the outside, does
not constitute evidence that a feature is capable of sustaining human
habitation";82 and (4) "purely extractive economic activities, which accrue no
benefit for the feature or its population, would not amount to an economic
life of the feature as 'of its own.'"83 Moreover, a feature is to be assessed in
its naturalcondition, or the feature's condition before there were any manmade enhancements by a State claiming sovereignty over it.84 Finally, a
tribunal's inability to rule on sovereignty over a feature should not prevent it
from assessing that feature's status under Article 121(3), which can be done
without considering or prejudicing disputed sovereignty claims.85
The Tribunal concluded that none of the features at issue were "capable of
sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own," and therefore
they could not generate entitlements to an EEZ or a continental shelf.86

E.

THE M1ARumE

ENVIRONMENT

The Tribunal was also the first to reach the merits stage to determine the
content and scope of UNCLOS's environmental provisions.
As a starting point, the Tribunal observed that the Convention's
substantive environmental provisions apply to all States, within and beyond
their national jurisdictions. The Tribunal ruled that Article 192 "entails the
positive obligation to take an active measure to protect and preserve the
marine environment," or, in other words, a "duty to prevent," but also "the
negative obligation not to degrade the marine environment."87 Additionally,
Article 194 encompasses a duty of due diligence.88
With respect to the protection of endangered species, the due diligence
obligation includes the duty to prevent "the direct harvesting" of
endangered species, as well as the destruction of their habitat.89 The duty of
due diligence is fulfilled by the adoption of "rules and measures to prevent"
certain acts under States' jurisdiction or control, and through enforcement.90
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Award, supra note 52,
Id. T 546.
Id. 1 550.
Id. T 500.
Id. T 508.
Id. T 545.
Id. 9 626.
Id. T 941.
Id. T 944.
Id. T 959.
Id. $ 961.

1 538.
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Further, the Tribunal reaffirmed that State Parties have a "direct
obligation" to conduct environmental impact assessments. 91 They must, "as
far as practicable," conduct such an assessment when there are "reasonable
grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or
control may cause significant and harmful changes to the marine
environment,"92 and they must also communicate the results to "competent
international organizations."93
China's activities in the South China Sea, including its unprecedented
island-building activities and its tolerance of the harvesting of endangered
species, led the Tribunal to conclude that China violated its environmental
obligations under the Convention.94
IV. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes
The ICSID Convention celebrated its fiftieth anniversary on October 14,
The year 2016 also marked a number of noteworthy developments
in ICSID arbitration.
2016.95

A.

TREATY DEFINITION OF INVESTOR'S SEAT

In Tenaris S.A. v. Venezuela, the applicable Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) required the investor to be incorporated and have its seat in the home
state.96 Venezuela argued that the investors did not qualify under the treaties
because they did not have any genuine links to either of the two countries,
and the bulk of the employees were in a third country.97 The Tribunal
rejected this argument, noting that the seat requirement could not be
equated with the "real economic activities" criteria.98 Applying a "flexible"
test, the Tribunal concluded that even though both companies were holding
companies, they were effectively seated in those countries, because it was in
99
those countries that their holding activities were carried out.
But in CEAC v. Montenegro, the Tribunal found (in a two-to-one decision)
that the claimant's registered office being located in Cyprus was insufficient
grounds to meet the "seat" requirement under the Cyprus-Montenegro
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. '1 947-48.
Id. 1 987 (quoting United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 206).
Award, supra note 52, IT 948, 991.
Id. ¶ 993.

95. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of

Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
96. Tenaris S.A. & Talta-Trading E Mktg. Sociedade Unipessoal LDA v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26, Award, 1 115 (Jan. 29, 2016), icsidfiles.worldbank.org/
icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1820/DC7492_En.pdf.
97. Id. ¶¶ 119-120.
98. Id. IT 142-143.
99. Id. TJ 200, 206-16.
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BIT00 In this case, the respondent presented unrebutted evidence that the
Cypriot registered office was unoccupied and was not used for commercial
activity.101 Further, the majority noted that there were very few documents
that dealt with the company's actual activities in Cyprus, despite
representations to the contrary.1 02

B.

MERITS

In Rusoro Mining v. Venezuela, the Tribunal found that Venezuela
unlawfully expropriated Rusoro's investment by implementing a series of
measures that regulated the country's gold production market, and then
passed a decree that transferred its mining rights to the State, deprived the
investment of its economic value, and failed to provide adequate
compensation.103 The Tribunal also found that a 2010 resolution, which
limited the amount of gold that foreign investors could export, breached the
Annex to the BIT, which prohibits restrictions on the export of products by
volume.04 But the Tribunal dismissed a creeping expropriation claim,
finding that there was no evidence that the measures were interconnected,
because measures taken in 2010 that partially re-liberated the gold market
seemed to undo the more stringent restrictions implemented in 2009.105
The Tribunal also found that several measures did not breach Venezuela's
commitment to provide fair and equitable treatment (FET),106 and ordered
Venezuela to pay $971,079,502 in damages, interest, and costs. 1 0 7

In Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venezuela, the Tribunal found that Venezuela
breached the Canada-Venezuela BIT by denying a key environmental
permit, and then rescinding a concession contract owned by Crystallex.108
The Tribunal found that a letter from Venezuela requesting that Crystallex
post a construction compliance bond created a legitimate expectation that
the permit was forthcoming, and that Venezuela breached its FET
obligations by denying the permit and rescinding the contract. 0 9 The
Tribunal also found a breach based on a creeping expropriation arising from
the denial of the permit, the issuance of political statements indicating a
political intention to oust the investor, and the subsequent recession of the
100. CEAC Holdings Ltd. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/8, Award, T 148 Ouly 26,
2016), icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3424/DC8694_en.pdf.
101. Id. T 191.
102. Id. TT 205-07.
103. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5,
Award, ¶1 373-410 (Aug. 22, 2016), www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw75O7.pdf.
104. Id. ¶¶ 584-97.
105. Id. T¶ 430-38.
106. Id. ¶1 527-41.
107. Id. 1 904.
108. Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2,
Award, ¶9 18-63 (Apr. 4, 2016), www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7194
.pdf.
109. Id. T9 575, 623.
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contract.n'o Like in Rusoro, the course of events was also found to be an
unlawful direct expropriation."' The tribunal awarded the investor $1.202
million plus interest.112

In Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the Tribunal dismissed Philip Morris's claims
brought under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT.11 The case arose from
Uruguay's imposition of tobacco control measures; the prohibition on
marketing more than one variant of cigarette per brand family; and the 80/
80 Regulation, which increased the size of health warnings on cigarette
packaging to 80 percent." 4 The Tribunal embraced the police powers
exception to the expropriation claim, noting Uruguay's interest in the health
of its citizensi"s and the fact that there can be no "indirect expropriation"
where the business retains "sufficient value."16 Further, the Tribunal found
that the implemented measures did not constitute an FET breach and were
not arbitrary or discriminatory because they were reasonable attempts to
protect public health."17 Gary Born, in a dissent, stated that the single
presentation requirement was an FET breach; that the World Health
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control did not explicitly
recommend a similar measure; and that the measure was implemented in a
mere few days."1s
C.

ABUSE

OF

PROCESS

In Transglobal Green Energy, LLC v. Panama, the Tribunal declined
jurisdiction, finding that the investor's attempt to invoke international
jurisdiction over a domestic dispute was an abuse of the investment treaty
process.1 9 La Mina, a Panamanian company, had entered into a concession
contract with The National Authority of Public Services (ASEP), Panama's
agency regulating public utilities, to "build and operate a hydroelectric
power plant."20 ASEP issued a resolution terminating the concession
contract when La Mina failed to commence construction by the agreed upon
110. Id.

1

668-708.

111. Id. ¶¶ 711-18.
112. Id. 1 961.
113. Philip Morris Brands Sirl, Philip Morris Prod. S.A. & Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Urug., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 590 (uly 8, 2016),
icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf.
114. Id. IJ 108-32.

115. Id. IT 291-307.
116. Id. ¶ 286.
117. Id. IT 388-420.
118. Philip Morris Brands Sirl, Philip Morris Prod. S.A. & Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Urug., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (Born,
Arbitrator), IT 192-97 (July 8, 2016), www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw7428.pdf.
119. Transglobal Green Energy, LLC & Transglobal Green Pan., S.A. v. Republic of Pan.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/28, Award, ¶¶ 118, 130 (June 2, 2016), icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3144/DC8333_En.pdf.
120. Id. 1 50.
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deadline.121 The Supreme Court held that La Mina's concession contract
remained in force and ordered restitution of the concession.122 While
awaiting implementation of the court order, the owner of La Mina signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) and a partnership and transfer
agreement with Transglobal Green Energy, LLC, a company incorporated
in the United States, in order to create a special-purpose entity to undertake
the project-Transglobal Green Energy (TGGE Panama), a company to be
incorporated in Panama.123 But, ASEP denied several requests to enforce
the Supreme Court decision or transfer the concession to TGGE Panama.124
Panama argued that the claimants wrongfully invoked "international
jurisdiction over a domestic dispute," which essentially pertained to
Panama's efforts to implement the Supreme Court decision by creating
international ownership.125 In evaluating the abuse of process objection, the
Tribunal considered the circumstances of the BIT claim, including "the
timing of the purported investment, the timing of the [international] claim,
the substance of the transaction, the true nature of the operation, and the
degree of foreseeability of the governmental action at the time of
restructuring."]26 The Tribunal recognized that while Transglobal created
the new company to effectuate the Supreme Court's ruling, Transglobal
retained de facto control over the investment through voting rights, and it
twice sought arbitration suspensions based on developments in the Panama
proceedings. 127

V.

The EU-Led Permanent Investment Court

In October 2015, the European Union (EU) set out a fundamentally new
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) policy in response to widespread
criticism of the ad hoc ISDS system, which became evident during the 2014
public consultation on the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). In its "Trade for All" policy, the European
Commission stated that the "status quo [of ad hoc investment arbitration] is
not an option"28 for future investment treaty models. Nearly in tandem, the
European Commission published a concept paper setting out the proposed

121. Id. 1 52.
122. Id. ¶1 54-58.
123. Id. ¶9 59-64.
124. Id. ¶1 65-74.
125. Id. 1 85.
126. Id. 1 103.
127. Id. ¶1 104-18.
128. Trade for All: Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy, EuR. COMM'N, at 21
(2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf.
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investment court, 129 which was shortly followed by a full proposal deployed
in the course of TTIP negotiations.130
The EU has since acted on its new investment policy and proposal,
incorporating the investment court model in its recent trade and investment
agreements including, among others, the Canada-EU Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), signed on October 30, 2016, and
the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It is clear that, at least for
the EU, the investment court model is the way forward.
At present, each treaty envisages its own bilateral permanent Investment
Court. Although their features are broadly similar, some differences do
exist. The TTIP and CETA Investment Courts would have a court of first
instance (the Tribunal), comprised of fifteen judges,131 while the EUVietnam FTA provides for nine judges.132 The TTIP and the EU-Vietnam
ETA provide for an appeal tribunal with six members.133 The CETA
provides for an appellate tribunal with an unspecified number of members;
to be determined by a committee.'1* All judges are to be appointed by State
parties to these treaties. The Court of First Instance is to sit in benches of
three members each, chosen at random.
The courts would be administered by a multilateral institution: CETA
proceedings are to be administered by ICSID,13s while the TTIP and the
EU-Vietnam FTA give parties the option between ICSID and the
Permanent Court of Arbitration.136 The function of the Court is largely left
to the discretion of the appointed members and treaty parties. At present, it
is not clear where such an institution would be physically located. The
treaty texts do not provide for an arbitral seat, thus allowing for the
possibility of a virtual seat, with arbitrations being held in one location.
In response to critiques from civil society and the international bar, ethical
obligations have become mandatory under each treaty's text. The ethics
provisions prohibit members of the Investment Court from acting as legal
counsel in investment dispute cases and improves transparency for arbitrator
challenges. Appointed members may act as arbitrators outside of the
129. Concept Paper:Investment in TTIP and beyond - the pathfor reform, EuR. COMM'N, at 4 (May
5, 2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.pdf.
130. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (EU, Proposed Official Draft Nov. 12,
2015), available at trade.ec.europa.eudocib/htnl 153955.htm.
131. TTIP art. 9(2); Canada - European Union Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement
[hereinafter CETA] art. 8.27(2) (signed on Oct. 30, 2016), http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/10.aspx?lang=eng.
132. European Union - Vietnam Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA] art.
12(2) (published on Feb. 1, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437.
133. TTIP art. 10(2); EU-Vietnam FTA art. 13(2).
134. CETA art. 8.28(7)(f).
135. CETA art. 8.27(16). The CETA does not identify who will administer the Appellate
Tribunal. Pursuant to Article 8.28(7), this is a decision that will have to be made by the
Committee.
136. TTIP art. 9(16) and art. 10(15). The administering institution remains in bracketed text
in the November draft. See also EU-Vietnam ETA art. 12(18) and art. 13(18).
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Investment Court. The CETA provides for an ethical code and requires that
the judges follow the International Bar Association's Guidelines on Conflict of
Interest for Arbitrators. It remains to be seen how effective these mandatory
provisions will be in practice.
To date, there have been several commentaries on the Investment Court
proposal.137 The ABA's Investment Treaty Working Group's Task Force
Report on the Investment Court analyzed in detail the Investment Court
proposal, and concluded that the Investment Court System, as currently
articulated, is a work in progress. Concerns were raised about the
appointment system, the functioning of the Court, and the enforceability of
its awards. Some of these concerns may be addressed if the Investment
Court is multi-lateralized though a further instrument.
Each treaty text provides that the Investment Court will be multilateralized, with only one institution deciding disputes brought under all EU
treaties (and potentially others as well).13 The EU has started the process
towards a multilateral investment court by creating a parallel path alongside
the bilateral texts with the publication of a multilateralization road. But the
EU is currently conducting an impact assessment,1 39 and it may affect how
the Investment Court will be multi-lateralized.
At the time of writing this article, it is doubtful that the TTIP will
advance under a Trump administration. But it is clear that the EU will move
forward with the Investment Court through other agreements, such as the
CETA and the EU-Vietnam FTA, and that the Investment Court is likely to
be established in either a bilateral or multilateral form in the coming years.

137. See, e.g., Investment Treaty Working Group: Task Force Report on the Investment Court System
Proposal, AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, (Oct. 14, 2016), http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/com
mittee.cfm?com=IC730000; Koorosh Ameli et al., EFILA Task ForcePaperRegarding the Proposed
International Court System (ICS), at 15, (Feb. 1, 2016), http://efila.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/EFILA TASKFORCEonICS.proposall-2-2016.pdf
138. TTIP art. 12; CETA art. 8.29; EU-Vietnam FTA art. 15.
139. Evtablishment of a MultilateralInvestment Courtfor investment dispute resolution, EUROPEAN
COMMISSIoN, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016 trade_024-court oninvestmenten.pdf.
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